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Abstract
In this paper, we investigate interaction between two ﬁrms engaged in a repeated
procurement relationship modelled as a multiple criteria auction, and an auctioneer (a
government employee) who has discretion in devising the selection criteria.
A ﬁrst result is that, in a one-shot context, favoritism turns the asymmetric informa-
tion (private cost) procurement auction into a symmetric information auction (in bribes)
for a common value prize. In a repeated setting we show that favoritism increases the gains
from collusion and contributes to solving basic implementation problems for a cartel of
bidders that operates in a stochastically changing environment. A most simple allocation
rule where ﬁrms take turn in winning independently of stochastic government preferences
and ﬁrms’ costs is optimal. In each period the selection criteria is ﬁne-tailored to the
in-turn winner: the "environment” adapts to the cartel. This result holds true when the
expected punishment is a ﬁxed cost. When the cost varies with the magnitude of the
distortion of the selection criteria (compared with the true government’s preferences),
favoritism only partially shades the cartel from the environment. Nevertheless, even in
this case favoritism greatly simpliﬁes matters for the cartel. We thus ﬁnd that favoritism
generally facilitates collusion at a high cost for society. Some policy implications of the
analysis are suggested.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Many cartels operate in a stochastically changing environment. In particular, this is the case
of ﬁrms involved in public procurement. The public demand for e.g., construction works
typically depends on a number of factors that are diﬃcult to predict. They include social
needs, elected representatives’ political agenda, internal budget concerns etc... In addition,
ﬁrms’ technology changes with time. Altogether this implies a signiﬁcant uncertainty about
the proﬁtability of future contracts. In face of such an uncertain environment, a cartel of
ﬁrms must devise a mechanism that while being responsive to changes does not open up for
gaming opportunities. In this paper we propose that favoritism can contribute to solving key
problems for a cartel of bidders that operate in a stochastically changing environment. A
main motivation for the paper is the mounting body of evidence that collusion and corruption
often go hand in hand in public procurement.
In France, practitioners and investigators in courts of accounts, competition authorities,
and in the judiciary have long been aware of the close links between collusion and corruption
in public procurement. The testimony of J. C. Mery provides suggestive evidence of those
links (Le Monde, September 22 and 23, 2000).1 A recent judgment in ‘Les Yvelines’ (Cour
d’Appel de Versaille, January 2002) provides a vivid illustration as well. According to a judge
investigating a major corruption case in Paris, there exists in France, almost not a single
case of large stake collusion in public procurement without corruption.2 Beside empirical
motivations, there are theoretical motivations for investigating the links between favoritism
and collusion. In particular, a cartel typically faces a tension between the eﬃciency goal
and the need to provide ﬁrms with incentives to reveal private information. A fair amount
of attention has been given to the theoretical problems facing a cartel that operates within
an imperfectly or privately observable environment. Recently, Athey and al. (2004) show
that it can simply be too costly for a price cartel to provide the right incentives for ﬁrms
to reveal private information about shocks to costs so the optimal mechanism entails price
rigidity (see also Green and Porter (1984) for the analysis of a price cartel on a market
1J. C. Mery, a City Hall oﬃcial, admitted that for ten years (1985-94) he organized and arbitrated collusion
in the allocation of most construction and maintenance contracts for the Paris City Hall. In exchange, ﬁrms
were paying bribes used to ﬁnance political parties.
2The case concerns the procurement of a 4.3 billion euros market for the recontruction of Paris’s lycees
(see Le Monde April 23 2005).
2with a demand subject to shocks). Our analysis is concerned with a cartel of bidders that
face both incomplete information about demand i.e., government preferences and asymmetric
information about shocks to ﬁrms’ costs. A central result is that favoritism can shade the
cartel from hazards in the environment. The cartel can achieve full (cartel) eﬃciency with
a non-contingent allocation rule so that ﬁrms take turn to win in a pre-determined manner.
The cartel needs not adapt to the environment. Instead the environment adapts to the cartel:
the contract is ﬁne-tailored to the pre-determined in-turn winner. This result is established
for the case the expected punishment cost is independent of the magnitude of the distortion
of government preferences. When the expected punishment varies with that magnitude,
favoritism only partially shades the cartel from hazards in the environment. Favoritism still
greatly simpliﬁes matters for the cartel. But the equilibrium allocation is bounded away
from full cartel eﬃciency. Favoritism generally exacerbates the social costs of collusion: the
selected speciﬁcation is socially ineﬃciency and the price paid by the government is higher
than in the absence of favoritism.
We model the procurement procedure as a “ﬁrst score auction”. Two ﬁrms characterized
by a vector of cost parameters compete in scores with oﬀers that include a speciﬁcation of
the project and a price. Public preferences are stochastic. The procedure is administered by
an auctioneer who is a government employee. At the beginning of the period the auctioneer,
privately observes a signal of public preferences. His duty is to devise and announce a scoring
rule that reﬂects the (current) public preferences. In the absence of favoritism, the procedure
selects the socially eﬃcient speciﬁcation of the project.
The presence of asymmetric information between the government and its auctioneer im-
plies that the auctioneer has some discretion when deciding over the scoring rule. We call
favoritism the act of biasing the scoring rule in favor of one of the ﬁrms. Corruption is mod-
elled as an auction-like procedure that takes place before the oﬃcial auction. Firms compete
in (menus of) corrupt “deals” including a bribe and a demanded scoring rule. We ﬁnd that
with favoritism the procedure selects a non-standard speciﬁcation of the project. The in-
tuition is that the associated scoring rule induces minimal competition and thus maximal
proﬁt-if-win in the oﬃcial auction. In the one-shot setting favoritism turns the asymmet-
ric information private cost procurement auction, into a symmetric information auction (in
bribes) for a common value prize corresponding to inﬂuence over the design of the contract.
We then consider a situation where ﬁrms meet repeatedly, each period on a new market
3(the auctioneers are short-run players). We show that favoritism fully solves the cartel’s prob-
lems related to stochastic government preferences and privately observable costs. Provided
each ﬁrm is eﬃc i e n ta tp r o d u c i n gs o m es p e c i ﬁcation of the project, the cartel can earn the
maximal income in a scheme that selects the winner independently of the true preferences
and of ﬁrms’ costs. The intuition is that at the corruption stage ﬁrms submit corrupt deals
that truthfully reveal private information about their costs to the auctioneer. This is because
a corrupt auctioneer has own incentives to use that information to ﬁne-tailor the scoring rule
to the in-turn winner. Firms’ main concern is to contain competition in bribes. That is
achieved by opting for a ﬁxed in-turn allocation rule which makes any defection immediately
observable.
In an extension we investigate a case where the expected punishment for favoritism is a
function of the magnitude of the distortion between the announced scoring rule and the true
preferences. We ﬁnd that the central insights from the ﬁxed punishment case carry over. In
the stage game competition in bribes does not dissipates all the ﬁrms’ rents however. And in
the repeated setting the cartel may face a problem of imperfect public information. For high
cost of punishment, the optimal scheme is contingent on the true government preferences
which are never observed. The oﬃcial auction outcome is bounded away from full cartel
eﬃciency. For low cost of punishment the pre-determined in-turn allocation rule is optimal
and full cartel eﬃciency obtains.
The equilibrium allocation patterns emerging from the analysis is consistent with em-
pirical ﬁndings. There exists ample evidence e.g., in developing countries of problems of
maintenance of construction objects due to the non-standard design that was selected in the
international procurement procedure (see Rose-Ackerman 1999). Evidence from corruption
scandals in France also show that the tender winner is the most eﬃcient ﬁrm and that its
proﬁts often are larger than the average in the branch (30% contra 5%) as in the case with
the court case concerned with the series of constructions contracts in Paris.
This paper contributes to a growing literature on corruption in auction.3 The auctioneer’s
abuse of discretion to devise the selection rule has been studied in Che and Burget (2004)
in the context of a single auction. The present article is most closely related to Compte,
Lambert-Mogiliansky and Verdier (2005) and Lambert-Mogiliansky and Sonin (forthcoming
3See for instance Laﬀont J-J. and J. Tirole (1991), Celentani, M. and J. Ganunza, (2002), Che and Burget
(2004), Compte, Lambert-Mogiliansky and Verdier (2005).
42006). Both articles are concerned with links between corruption and collusion. They address
a cartel’s enforcement problem in a one-shot setting and focus on the impact of the auction-
eer’s abuse of discretion to let ﬁrms readjust their bid. In Compte et al. the auctioneer sells
an illegal opportunity to resubmit, which is shown to permit sustaining collusion in a single
object auction. In Lambert-Mogiliansky and Sonin, the auctioneer abuses a legal right to let
all ﬁrms simultaneously readjust their oﬀer in the context of a multiple-object auction. As a
consequence collusive market-sharing becomes sustainable. The contribution of the present
paper is to demonstrate corruption’s role with respect to another central problem of a cartel:
how to achieve (cartel) eﬃciency in a stochastically changing environment.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is described in section 2. Section 3 oﬀers an
analysis of the one-stage game. In Section 4 we derive our central results. Section 5 proposes
an extension to the case with varying punishment cost. Central assumptions are discussed in
section 6 where we also suggest policy implications for procurement and control agencies.
2 The model
In each time period a project is allocated. A project allows for a multiplicity of speciﬁca-
tions. A speciﬁcation is a vector q =(q1,...q k) where qj represents the level of the j (quality)



















,j=1 ,...,k is ﬁrm i0s cost parameter associated with quality component







is ﬁrm i’s private information.
In each period there is a new draw of (θ1,θ2). For the sake of convenience we remove the
realizations θt
i =( θ,θ,...,θ),i=1 ,2 from the support. We also remove the joint realizations
where one of the ﬁrms is strictly more eﬃcient than the other and when the ﬁrms are fully
identical.4 The probability of the realizations left are proportional to the probabilities which
we would have if parameters θt
ij are i.i.d. with prob(θt
ij = θ)=ρ across all i,j and t.5
4Behind practical convenience, the idea is that both ﬁrms must be suﬃciently eﬃcient (they have low cost
on at least one component) and diﬀerent from each other i.e., they have a comparative advantage in at least
one component.
5The precise characterization of the probability is rather complex but its details play no role for our results.
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of parameters representing the true social preference in period t. A zero value for a component
j, αt
j =0is understood as no social value of qj above a minimal level that deﬁnes a “basic
good”. The vector αt is random with a uniform measure on ∆k−1. The government does not
know the true αt. It hires an auctioneer who privately observes a signal of the true αt at the
beginning of each period. For simplicity we assume that the signal is fully informative.6
The auction rule
At the beginning of each period the auctioneer announces a selection criteria which is a
function of both price p and quality q =( q1,...,q k). We consider a class of selection criteria
similar to the government’s utility function:
S (q, b α)=s(q, b α) − p =
k X
j=1
b αjqj − p,
k X
j=1
b αj =1 ,
where b α is the vector of parameters announced by the auctioneer (see Timing below).
Throughout the paper we refer to b α as the “scoring rule” which is a slight abuse of lan-
guage since the score of an oﬀer is determined by its price also according to the selection
criterion. The ﬁrms simultaneously submit in a sealed envelop an oﬀer including a project
speciﬁcation qt
i and a price pt
i. The contract is awarded to ﬁrm i∗t whose oﬀer maximizes


















The winner is due to deliver the speciﬁcation qt
i∗ at price pt
i∗. In case of tie in scores the
project is awarded to the ﬁrm whose “quality score”( i.e., s(q, b α)) is highest. In case of tie
in both price and quality the auctioneer randomizes. We refer to this procedure as a First
Score Auction (FSA).
6This is a not an assumption crucial to our results.










Proﬁt-if-lose is zero. The game is inﬁnitely repeated with the same two ﬁrms but with a
diﬀerent auctioneer in each period. The ﬁrms discount future gains with a common factor δ.
Their payoﬀ for the whole game is the discounted sum of the per period payoﬀs.
Corruption
The auctioneer is opportunistic. He accepts bribes in exchange for announcing a scoring
rule i.e., some b α. The auctioneer’s utility is
U = w + b − m,
where w is a wage that we normalize to 0,bis a bribe and m ≥ 0 is a term that captures moral
and other costs e.g. expected punishment for distorting the government preferences and for
taking bribes.7 In the basic model expected punishment is a ﬁxed cost. This is consistent
with e.g., French legislation (Code Penal 432-14, 432-11). In an extension we consider the
special case where k =2and the expected punishment depends on the magnitude of the
distortion of social preferences so U = b − m(b α1 − α1)
2. Such a model can be relevant when
the magnitude of the distortion signiﬁcantly aﬀects the probability of detection. We discuss
these assumptions in section 6.
Corruption is modelled as a procedure whereby the ﬁrms compete in corrupt “deals”
where a deal is an oﬀer to pay a bribe in exchange for a speciﬁc scoring rule. The two ﬁrms
simultaneously and secretly submit a menu of deals Mi = {(αil,b il),l=1 ,...,n i},w h e r eni is
freely chosen by ﬁrm i. The bribe is only paid by the oﬃcial auction’s winner if the announced
scoring rule corresponds to one he demanded and the oﬀers submitted in the oﬃcial auction
are not identical i.e., include both the same quality speciﬁcation and the same price. This
rule is not crucial to the main results but it greatly simpliﬁes the analysis as it contributes
to aligning ﬁrms’ and the auctioneer’s incentives. It is also consistent with the presumption
that fully identical oﬀers reﬂect ﬁerce competition so favoritism brings no gain to the winning
ﬁrm.
7The government can engage a procedure to ﬁnd out its true preferences and punish the auctioneer if he
distorted them in his announcement.
73 The stage game
The stage game is deﬁned by the following Timing:
Step 0: Firms learn privately their cost parameters θ1 and θ2.
step 1: The auctioneer learns α, the ﬁrms submit M1 = {(b1l,α1l)} and M2 = {(b2l,α2l)})
respectively;
step 2: The auctioneer makes an announcement b α, b α ∈ ∆k−1;
step 3: The ﬁrms submit (qi,p i),i=1 ,2;
step 4: The auctioneer publicly opens the envelops and he selects the ﬁrm whose oﬀer
maximizes the selection criteria corresponding to the announced scoring rule. The winner i∗
pays a bribe b i fa n do n l yi f(b α,b) ∈ Mi∗. Otherwise no bribe is paid.
We ﬁrst establish a result applying to the First Score Auction described by the Timing
above when deleting step 1 from consideration and as we show later applying to any subgame
starting from step 2. Throughout the paper we consider subgame perfect equilibria.
Lemma 1 The subgame perfect equilibrium oﬀers of the FSA are characterized by speciﬁca-
tion eﬃciency: q∗
i =a r gm a xs(q, b α) − c(q;θi).
All proofs are gathered in the appendix.
The result exploits separability between quality and price in the selection criteria. It can
be shown that for any oﬀer not including the eﬃcient values for the components, we can ﬁnd
another oﬀer with the same score but that yields a higher expected proﬁt.
T h er e s u l ti nL e m m a1g r e a t l ys i m p l i ﬁes the forthcoming analysis. Lemma 1 allows us to,
at step 3, separate between ﬁrms’ oﬀer of project speciﬁcation and their price bid.8 The equi-
librium values of the components are the eﬃcient ones corresponding to the announcement
b α
q∗










When the announcement corresponds to the true government preferences, Lemma 1 implies
social eﬃciency in project speciﬁcation.
8A similar result can be found in Che (1993).
83.1 Favoritism
We now proceed to investigate the one-shot game described in Timing above.
Proposition 1 In any Bayes-Nash equilibrium we have that
i. For m ≤ (θ−θ)
2θθ and θ1 6= θ2 the equilibrium scoring rule is b α
∗ =( 0 ,...,1j,...0) for some
θj;θ1j 6= θ2j and b∗
1j = b∗
2j = (θ−θ)
2θθ for all j. When m>(θ−θ)
2θθ or θ1 = θ2 (θ1j = θ2j for all
j) there is no favoritism .
ii. The equilibrium oﬀers are the competitive oﬀers relative to the announced scoring rule.
A ﬁrst result is that whatever the true government preferences, favoritism always entails
an extreme (single-peaked) scoring rule b α
∗ = b α
j =( 0 ,...,1j,...0) for some j.9 The intuition
for the single-peakness result is that the winner’s proﬁt is maximal when the scoring rule
emphasizes a single component for which he has a comparative advantage. Alternatively, a
selection rule including a single-peaked scoring rule induces the "weakest possible competitive
pressure" among all FSA generated by any selection rule from the relevant class.
The interpretation of this result is that with favoritism the scoring rule tends to drive
to a minimum the weight given to most components while emphasizing quite exclusively a
component characterized by weak competition in production.10 This means that the winning
project has a speciﬁcation that tends to be “non-standard”. We note that the true govern-
ment’s preferences have minimal impact on the announced scoring rule. In case of ties in the
corruption game, the auctioneer may choose the deal that is most congruent with the true
preferences.
Quite remarkably we ﬁnd that ﬁrms’ asymmetric information is a minor concern in our
context. The intuition is that while an honest auctioneer uses information about costs to
minimize ﬁrms’ rents11, a corrupt auctioneer has incentives to use that information to devise
a scoring rule that maximizes the winning ﬁrm’s rents. In equilibrium the ﬁrms’ cost structure
9We show in section 5 below (Extensions) that this result is robust to other speciﬁcation of the punishment
costs. The general argument is similar to that in Lemma 1. It rests on the separability between bribe and
punishment in the auctioneer’s utility function (see Lemma 2 in the proof of Proposition 4).
10Strictly speaking the interpretation of zero weight as a minimal level is equivalent to assuming that
ﬁrms are (more or less identical) in the production of a ”basic good” while they diﬀer in the production of
speciﬁcations of the project in excess of the requirement deﬁning the ”basic good”.
11If the honest auctioneer knew the ﬁrms’ costs, he would simply give the contract to the most eﬃcient ﬁrm
and pay it its actual cost i.e., he would leave no rents to the winner. Therefore ﬁrms are unwilling to reveal
their costs.
9is revealed in the submitted menus of deals and ﬁrms infer all relevant information about
each other’s cost structure from the announced scoring rule. The equilibrium oﬀers are the
(unique) competitive Nash equilibrium oﬀers of the symmetric information FSA deﬁned by
the announced scoring rule (for details see the appendix). The oﬀered speciﬁcations are
eﬃcient relative to b α
∗ and the equilibrium price is determined by the second score.
Competition for favors drives up the bribe to (θ−θ)
2θθ (≥ m) which is the proﬁtt h a ty i e l d s
with a scoring rule that is most favorable to the winner. Since this proﬁt is the same for the
two ﬁrms, the auctioneer captures the totality of the winning ﬁrm’s rents. In the remaining
of the paper we assume that m<(θ−θ)
2θθ so the stage game is characterized by favoritism.12
In eﬀect, favoritism turns the asymmetric information (private cost) auction, into a sym-
metric information common value auction (in bribes) for a prize. The prize is inﬂuence over
the design of the selection rule which has a common value corresponding to the gain when
winning the oﬃcial auction with a maximally favorable selection criteria. This gain is common
knowledge and identical for both ﬁrms.13 The social cost of favoritism is twofold. First, a
socially ineﬃcient project speciﬁcation is selected. Second, the price paid by the government
is higher than in the absence of favoritism. The bias in project speciﬁcation due to favoritism
minimizes competition between ﬁrms. The equilibrium depicted in Proposition 1 will serve
a threat point in the collusive schemes we study next.
4 Repeated interaction
We now proceed to investigate a situation when the two ﬁrms interact repeatedly. In each
period they meet on a public market administered by a new auctioneer, e.g., diﬀerent local





. We are interested in collusion
between the two ﬁrms under the assumption that transfers between them are precluded.
Information assumptions
12When reviewing court cases, it appears quite clear that the cost of favoritism is very low. The only
instances of conviction for favoritism in France pertain to cases where the auctioneer explicitly required a ﬁrm
speciﬁct e c h n o l o g y .( C o u rd e sG r a c e s2 0 0 2) .
13We consider a symmetric case but the logic would be the same if we allowed for some asymmetry in the
cost structure. All that a ﬁrm needs to know is the other ﬁrm’s value of winning the contract under the most
favorable circumstances i.e., with a selection rule that gives full weight to a component such that the ﬁrm has
the largest comparative advantage in its production.
10At the end of each period the submitted contract oﬀers are publicly observed by the
two ﬁrms and the active auctioneer. The corrupt deal oﬀers remain private information to
the involved parties. The true value of α is never revealed. The public history of the game
up to period t is denoted Ht. Each auctioneer is appointed for one period and there is no
communication between auctioneers from diﬀerent periods.
4.1 Collusion
As a benchmark we characterize the optimal collusive scheme under symmetric information
and in the absence of favoritism. The timing of the stage game is as follows.
Step 0: Firms learn the cost parameters θ1 and θ2.
step 1: The auctioneer learns αt and makes an announcement b α, b α ∈ ∆k−1;
step 2: The ﬁrms submit (qi,p i);
step 3: The auctioneer selects the ﬁrm whose oﬀer maximizes the announced selection
criteria.
The two ﬁr m sp l a yt h i sg a m er e p e a t e d l ya ni n ﬁnite number of periods each time with a
new auctioneer. They discount the future with a common factor δ.
Proposition 2 There exists δ0 < 1, such that for δ ≥ δ0 collusion is a Bayes-Nash equilib-
rium of the repeated game. An optimal collusive scheme entails an allocation rule contingent
on the true government preferences and on the ﬁr m s ’c o s t s .T h ew i n n e ri s( o n eo f )t h em o s t
eﬃcient ﬁrm(s) relative to the government’s true preferences.
Proposition 2 establishes that in any optimal collusive scheme the winner’s identity de-
pends on the government true preferences and on the ﬁrm’s cost. This is not surprising since
for any given selection criteria, the cartel’s income is maximized when the most eﬃcient ﬁrm
relative to that criteria implements the contract. With symmetric information about costs
and in the absence of favoritism the optimal collusive cartel can be implemented. We shall
not investigate the asymmetric information optimal cartel, which is a serious enterprise aside
the main focus of this paper. We content ourselves with taking notice of the dependence
of the optimal symmetric information scheme on ﬁrms’ costs implies that under asymmetric
information any collusive scheme is likely to be plagued by ineﬃciency. This is due to ﬁrms’
incentive to distort information and mimic other cost structures to increase the probability
to win. Similar issues have been thoroughly investigated in Athey et al. (2004).
114.2 Collusion and Favoritism: A Strategic Complementarity
We now consider a repetition of the game described in Timing (Section 3) i.e., we are back
in the asymmetric information context. Proposition 3 constitutes the central result of this
paper.
Proposition 3 i. There exists δ1 < 1 such that for δ ≥ δ1 full cartel eﬃciency is achievable
in a Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the repeated game.
ii. In the oﬃcial auction ﬁrms take turn in winning independently of government prefer-
ences and ﬁrms’ costs.
iii. The equilibrium scoring rule is single-peaked (i.e., b α =( 0 ,...,1,...0)) and the winning
ﬁrm i∗ pays a bribe bi∗ = m.
Full cartel eﬃciency is deﬁned for the oﬃc i a la u c t i o na sf o l l o w s . i . I ne a c hp e r i o dt h e
winner is (one of) the most eﬃcient ﬁrms relative to the announced selection criteria; ii.
The selection criteria that applies yields the highest gains to the winning ﬁrm from among
all possible selection criteria. Proposition 3 establishes that with favoritism full cartel eﬃ-
ciency is achievable in spite of asymmetric information.14 The cartel needs not adapt to the
”environment” i.e., to the current cost structure or to the current government preferences.
Instead the environment adapts to the cartel: in each period the auctioneer is bribed to
ﬁne-tailor the scoring rule to the in-turn winner. The optimal allocation rule is extremely
simple: ﬁrm take turn for winning in a non-contingent manner. A main concern for the cartel
is to contain competition in bribes which can be very costly as we learned from proposition 1.
Proposition 3 shows that competition for favors can be eliminated by opting for the simplest
non-contingent in-turn allocation rule. At the corruption stage both ﬁrms oﬀer a menu of
d e a l se a c hw i t has i n g l e - p e a k e ds c o r i n gr u le as in proposition 1. The out-of-turn ﬁrm oﬀers
a zero bribe while the in-turn winner oﬀer a bribe that just covers the expected punishment
cost: m. The out-of-turn ﬁrm may deviate and (unobserved) bribe the auctioneer to announce
a scoring rule favorable to itself. This is immediately detected however - the pre-determined
in-turn rule is violated - and punished by reverting to the equilibrium of proposition 1 which
yields zero payoﬀ to the ﬁrms from next period on. This explains why the bribe can be kept
to a minimum of m ≥ 0. In the oﬃcial auction the out-of-turn ﬁrm submits an oﬀer that
14Notice that the ﬁrm that wins ﬁrst has a higher expected discounted payoﬀ.W ec a ne q u a t et h et w oﬁrms’
discounted payoﬀs by randomly designing the ﬁrst winner.
12scores at most zero. Since contract oﬀers become public information any defection at that
stage is detected after the oﬃcial opening and punished similarly.
We thus see that favoritism facilitates collusion in several ways. The gains from collusion
are higher than with an honest auctioneer: the scoring rule is ﬁne-tailored to maximize the
winner’s proﬁt. While the threat payoﬀs are lower than in the absence of corruption be-
cause competition in bribes dissipates the rents. Most importantly we ﬁnd that favoritism
solves key problems for a repeated cartel in a stochastic environment. The auctioneer’s self-
interested determination of the scoring rule eﬀectively shades the cartel from ﬂuctuations
in the proﬁtability of projects due to stochastic government preferences and changing costs.
The environment “adapts” to the cartel and ex-post eﬃciency i.e., eﬃciency relative to the
announced scoring rule, is secured. But this comes at a cost, the bribe. The ﬁxed in-turn rule
eliminates competition in bribes. For k suﬃciently large ﬁrms are better oﬀ with favoritism
than without.15
In the equilibrium of the one-shot game the agent is limited to choosing a scoring rule
that minimizes competition i.e., a scoring rule emphasizing a (single) component such that
ﬁrms have diﬀerentiated technologies (costs). In the repeated setting with collusion, the agent
needs not bother about cost diﬀerentials. So in a sense collusion makes favoritism “easier":
the agent’s equilibrium choice set is larger.
Remark 1 The social cost of collusion is generically higher with favoritism than without.
This follows from the fact that favoritism induces a socially ineﬃcient project speciﬁcation
while simple collusion does not (see Proposition 2 above). Since the selected project is always
non-standard, the government also pays a higher price than in the case of simple collusion. On
the other hand with favoritism eﬃciency (relative to the announced scoring rule) is secured.
The ﬁrms that actually implements the contract is cost eﬃcient. This is also true with simple
collusion but under symmetric information only. We have not characterized the asymmetric
information optimal collusive scheme but as earlier mentioned it is likely to be plagued by
some ex-post ineﬃciency.
15For k =3it can be shown that the per period expected payoﬀ is larger with favoritism than without
provided θ<3θ for all m ≤
D
2θθ.
135E x t e n s i o n s
In this section we extend the analysis by considering the case when the expected punishment
for favoritism depends on the magnitude of the di s t o r t i o no fs o c i a lp r e f e r e n c e s .W ed ot h a t
in a simpler setting with k =2so α1 = α and α2 =( 1− α). The auctioneer’s utility is U =
b − m(b α − α)








. The time line of events in stage game is as follows:
step 1: The auctioneer learns α, the ﬁrms submit (b1,α 1) and (b2,α 2);
step 2: The auctioneer makes an announcement b α, b α ∈ [0,1];
step 3: The ﬁrms submit (qi,p i);
step 4: The auctioneer selects the ﬁrm whose oﬀer maximizes the selection criteria corre-
sponding to the announced scoring rule. The winner i∗ pays the bribe he oﬀered whenever
the announced scoring rule is b α = αi∗. Otherwise no bribe is paid.
Proposition 4 characterizes symmetric Bayes Nash equilibria of the stage game described






Proposition 4 Any symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium is characterized by




1 for α ≥ 1/2
0 for α<1/2
;
ii. The equilibrium bribe is b∗
1 = b∗
2 = b∗ (m)=(θ−θ)
2θθ − m;
iii. The contract oﬀers are the competitive equilibrium oﬀers relative to the announced
scoring rule.
A ﬁrst important result is that the equilibrium scoring rule is single-peaked as in the ﬁxed
punishment case. In the appendix we prove this as Lemma 2. The intuition is that in the
corruption game ﬁrms compete in the auctioneer’s utility levels. This utility is separable in
bribe and expected punishment cost. We show that any deal with α/ ∈ {0,1} that achieves a
given utility to the auctioneer there exists a deal with α ∈ {0,1} that achieves the same utility
level but yields a higher expected proﬁtf o rt h eﬁrm. We also note that, as in Proposition 1,
the oﬃcial auction oﬀers are the (eﬃcient) competitive equilibrium oﬀers.
In contrast with earlier results competition for favors does not dissipate all ﬁrms’ rents.
The intuition is that contingent punishment costs introduces an asymmetry between ﬁrms:
the ﬁrm whose demanded scoring rule is closer to the true one is more attractive to the
auctioneer. Firms’ incomplete information about the true preferences therefore induces a
14continuity of the probability to win in the submitted bribe. As a result competition for favor
is mitigated.







2θθ is the competitive
proﬁt-if-win associated with the most favorable scoring rule, this range covers most interesting
cases.16 Over that range of value for m the proﬁt-if-win is simply πi∗ = m.
Summing up, with an expected punishment that is a function of distortion, the scoring
rule always induces a "non-standard" project but a downright reversal of the true prefer-
ences is precluded. The same outcome is obtained with a ﬁxed punishment when assuming
auctioneer’s weak preference for avoiding downright reversal. What government expenditure
concerns there is no advantage in the more sophisticated punishment rule. Finally, because
it mitigates competition in favors, some of the rents stay with the ﬁrms. We conclude that
in the stage game, the sophisticated punishment scheme oﬀers no advantage from the point
of view of social eﬃciency.
We now consider a repeated version of the game described above. As in the case with k-
components, the two ﬁrms meet in each period with a new (short-run) auctioneer. At the end
of each period, the submitted contracts oﬀers are publicly observed by the two ﬁrms and the
active auctioneer. The corrupt deal oﬀers remain private information to the involved parties.
T h et r u ev a l u eo fα is never revealed. There is no communication between auctioneers from
diﬀerent periods.
Proposition 5 i. For δ ≥ δ2∈ (0,1), there exists a Public Perfect Equilibrium equilibrium
of the repeated game with collusion in contract oﬀers and in corruption deals.
ii. For m small a simple pre-determined in-turn allocation rule is optimal while for m large
any optimal collusive scheme entails a contingent allocation rule.
A ﬁrst important remark is that collusion in contract oﬀers and in bribes is achievable
in a simple pre-determined in-turn scheme at b∗ = m. The reasoning is similar to that
in proposition 3. However, for m relatively large, the simple scheme implies a signiﬁcant
loss in revenue for the cartel. This is because in such a scheme the bribe always covers the
punishment cost associated with the maximal distortion of the scoring rule relative to the







the equilibrium bribe is equal to
the expected punishment cost and favoritism occurs less often until as the cost grows it gets fully prohibitive.
15true one. The bribe cost can be reduced in a contingent scheme but that may not always be
worthwhile because of imperfect public information which induces new ineﬃciencies.
We ﬁrst note that once the winner has been designated, collusion in the oﬃcial auction
is sustainable relying on a standard folk theorem argument. This is because oﬀers are ex-
post public information. In the scheme of Proposition 5, the announcement resulting from
competition in corruption deals determines the winner. The main issue for the cartel is
therefore to sustain collusion in corrupt deals in order to contain competition in bribes and
make an eﬃcient use of stochastic government preferences as an allocation rule. The problem
is that ﬁrms don’t know the true scoring rule and do not observe the submitted bribe deals.
They only observe the announced scoring rule which is an imperfect public signal of ﬁrms’
action in the corruption game. Therefore ﬁrms must sometime be “punished” even when
complying (this is similar to Green and Porter 1986, Radner, Myerson and Maskin 198617).
In the appendix we provide an example showing that collusion is sustainable in a Public
Perfect Equilibrium (PPE) with b∗ = 1
4m. AP P Ei sap r o ﬁle of public strategies that,
beginning any date t and given any public history till time t, form a Nash equilibrium.18
Deterrence from defection at the bribing stage is achieved by the threat of competition in
the oﬃcial auction. In case a ﬁrm wins twice in a row, it is “punished” by the other ﬁrm
which then submits an oﬀer that scores more than zero. This reduces the cartel’s revenue.
In this example there is an equilibrium with a contingent scheme that is bounded away from
full cartel eﬃciency but that dominates the ﬁxed in-turn rule scheme for m not too small.
The main insight from Proposition 5 is that when the simplest in-turn rule is too costly,
favoritism allows for a reasonably simple contingent collusive scheme to sustain collusion.
In the scheme we investigate, ﬁrms win a lower current period payoﬀ when they win for
the second period in a row. This is because we need to prevent defection in bribes. Only
the preceding period’s announced scoring rule matters. So unlike in the case with a ﬁxed
punishment cost, favoritism here does not fully shade ﬁrms from future hazards in preferences
and costs. Yet, matters are greatly simpliﬁed for ﬁrms. With favoritism the proﬁt-if-win is
fully known by force of single-peakness and depends minimally on the environment.
The results in proposition 5 apply to a symmetric information context. We conclude this
17A distinction with the mentioned articles is that in our context, it is in each case possible to identify the
possible defector and so to limit the in-equilibrium punishment to that player.
18As t r a t e g yf o rp l a y e ri is public if, at each time t, the strategy depends only on the public history and not
on i
0sp r i v a t eh i s t o r y .
16section with a few remarks suggesting that the main insights generalize to an asymmetric
information context where there is a new draw of θi in each period and it is privately observed
by ﬁrms. As before we delete the realizations when any one of the ﬁr m si si n e ﬃcient at the
production of both components.
F i r s tw en o t et h a tj u s ta si nt h es y m m e t r i ci nformation case collusion in contract oﬀers
and in bribes is achievable in a simple pre-determined in-turn scheme at b∗ = m.I naw o r k i n g
paper we show that a more sophisticated scheme that blends features of the pre-determined
in-turn rule with features of the contingent scheme can achieve collusion in bribes and contract
oﬀers while keeping the bribe to b∗ = 1
4m. Although the scheme is not truly complex, the
proof is rather laborious and lengthy that is why we chose to leave it out. In order to be able
to sustain this scheme the winning ﬁrm’s proﬁt from the FSA can never be the maximal gain
which suggests that for small m the simple predetermined in-turn rule can be optimal.
Our conclusion is that the central insight from proposition 3 i.e., that favoritism facil-
itates collusion and contributes to resolving implementation problems in face of demand
uncertainty (incomplete information about the true government preferences) and privately
observed shocks to costs, is robust to accounting for a punishment cost that varies with the
magnitude of the distortion.
6 Discussion and Policy implications
The main insights of the analysis can be summarized as follows:
• Favoritism facilitates collusion because
— It induces the revelation of ﬁrms’ private information as that information is used
by the corrupt auctioneer to maximize the winner’s rent;
— It shades ﬁrms from ﬂuctuations in government preferences. The selected contract
speciﬁcations reﬂect the cartel’s interests instead of social preferences;
• Favoritism exacerbates the cost of collusion for society. The contract speciﬁcation is
socially ineﬃcient and the price is higher than with collusion alone.
The analysis thus reveals that favoritism fundamentally perverts the auction mechanism
both what concerns the use of ﬁrms’ private information (about their costs) and that of the
agent’s private information about government preferences.
17A central intermediary result is that the equilibrium scoring rule is extreme i.e., "single-
peaked". In the one-shot setting this allows to minimize competition between ﬁrms. As
a result the selected project tends to be non-standard in the sense that the winning ﬁrm
is alone to be eﬃcient at its production. In the repeated setting competition is less of
an issue because of collusion. As a result the winning ﬁrm’s rents can be maximize for a
larger range of project speciﬁcations each of which responding to a single-peaked scoring
rule. Most procurement codes include provisions that preclude the use of non-standard
(a fortiori ﬁrm speciﬁc) speciﬁcations and that encourage generic technical speciﬁcation.
Interestingly, even for the simplest objects such as print paper one may not be able to deﬁne
a unique standard (see Compte and Lambert-Mogiliansky 2000). When dealing with complex
procurement projects, it is simply not realistic to expect being able to deﬁne a unique generic
speciﬁcation. Choices have to be made either by settling for a technical solution or in a scoring
rule. Often it is mistakenly believed that a ﬁrst price auction of a technically speciﬁed object
precludes favoritism. In Compte and Lambert-Mogiliansky (2000), it is demonstrated that
such procedure can be even more vulnerable to favoritism. A technical speciﬁcation can
bias competition at a larger cost for the government than a scoring rule. Generally, the
use of a scoring rule (that weights technical components or performance measures) increases
competition and thereby reduces the stake of favoritism. Our analysis applies within the
spectrum of discretion consistent with typical anti-favoritism provisions. It says that within
this spectrum, favoritism results in the selection of a project speciﬁcation that maximizes
the winner’s rent. It also says that collusion relaxes a constraint on equilibrium scoring rule
(i.e., it needs not minimize competition), w h i c hp r e s u m a b l ym a k e sf a v o r i t i s mm o r ed i ﬃcult
to detect.
Single-peakness as the solution to rent maximization, obtains from the conjunction of a
series of assumptions most of them are standard or reasonable. Two assumptions deserve
some comments: separability in costs between components and separability in bribes and
punishment cost. There is a natural way to reinterpret the single-peakness result when relax-
ing the assumption of separability in costs. If we have complementarities in costs, one should
group components that are complementary in production into a composite component that
is given full weight in a proper manner. Clearly, a more involved cost structure would entail
more complex computation of the demanded scoring rule(s) and a more involved operation
to compute the scoring rule that maximizes the winner’s rent (used in the stage game). A
18conjecture is that the menu of deal oﬀe r si ss u ﬃciently rich a message language to allow for
quite sophisticated information to be revealed so the auctioneer can minimize competition as
in the basic model. With (ex-ante) symmetric ﬁrms the prize i.e., winning the contract with
minimal competition is the same for both ﬁrms in which case most of the results carry over.
Some additional analysis may be required if we want to relax the assumption about separa-
bility in bribes and punishment. In particular to investigate the case when the auctioneer is
not willing to take a bribe so high that it covers the expected cost of all distortions. However,
evidence suggests (see footnote 8 and policy implications below) that the expected cost is
rather low in which case the problems related to bribe cap would not arise.
Our conjecture is thus that the main insights of the analysis do not depends on the ﬁne
details of the model but capture central features of the reality of favoritism in procurement
as revealed by empirical evidence. First there exists numerous anecdotal evidence e.g., from
developing countries. In one case an Africa country set its telephone speciﬁcation to require
equipment that could survive in frigid climate. Only one telephone company from Scandinavia
could satisfy this obviously worthless speciﬁcation (Rose-Ackerman 1999, p.64. Similarly
problems of maintenance of construction objects are often due to the non-standard project
speciﬁcation that was selected by the international procurement procedure. Second, the
allocation pattern emerging from the analysis: a pre-determined in-turn rule allocates the
contract to the most eﬃcient ﬁrm while generating large proﬁts is very close to the patterns
observed in Paris Hall case mentioned in the introduction. Interestingly, people have argued
that the fact that the contract were allocated to the most eﬃcient ﬁrm, was an indication
that there was no collusion. The present analysis shows that it is suﬃcient that each ﬁrm
has a comparative advantage in some component for this outcome to obtain in a collusive
equilibrium with favoritism.
Policy implications
A central message of the analysis is that the risks of collusion and favoritism are linked and
must be addressed simultaneously. Yet, the investigation of collusion is often the jurisdiction
of Competition Authorities while that of corruption is the jurisdiction of criminal courts. A
ﬁrst recommendation is to develop cooperation to overcome this institutional separation so
as to improve eﬃciency in the prosecution of cases that involve both favoritism (corruption)
19and collusion.
The analysis conﬁrms earlier results (see e.g., Laﬀont and Tirole 1993, Compte and
Lambert-Mogiliansky 2000, and Che and Burget 2004) that discretion to devise the scor-
ing rule or similarly to deﬁne the technical speciﬁcation is very sensitive to capture because
that decision strongly aﬀects ﬁrms’ payoﬀ. We already noted that most procurement code
includes provisions that encourage a standardization wherever it is possible. When that is
too costly (or not feasible), the auctioneer’s decision should be subjected to close scrutiny.
This recommendation is in line with Steven Kelman (1994)19 who argues in favor of preserved
ﬂexibility associated with increased accountability of procurement oﬃcials. Concretely this
means for instance an obligation to motivate their decisions in writing. Another type of
measures recognizes that ﬁrms often have a superior information about each other than the
government has. They can be in a position to recognize when a scoring rule is ﬁne-tailored to
some other ﬁrm. A recommendation would be to consider devising a mechanism to reveal this
information e.g., by performing an anonymous consultation prior the oﬃcial submission.20
The results suggest that over a signiﬁcant interval, an increase in m i.e., stricter controls
and/or more severe punishments, has no eﬀect on the cost of favoritism to society. Hence, we
ﬁnd that to be any eﬀective the expected punishment has to be very severe. This contrast
with the current legislation in the European Union that makes it very diﬃcult to convict for
favoritism. A central reason for this is that favoritism is diﬃcult to prove. Indeed, generally
any selection criteria would favor some ﬁrm(s) at the expense of others. "Deciding to build
a swimming pool rather than a stadium is good for ﬁrms that have a comparative advantage
in building swimming pools." The problem is thus to compare between selection criteria that
favor diﬀerent ﬁrms. The honest auctioneer picks up the one that is congruent with public
preferences while the corrupt selects another one. But public preferences are seldom so
well-deﬁned that congruence can be measured in a way that is non-controversial (which also
suggests that a ﬁxed punishment cost model maybe the relevant one). Generally, detecting
and proving the occurrence of favoritism is diﬃcult. An implication of the analysis is that
attention should be paid to a careful study of allocation patterns over time. Unfortunately
courts tend to focus on bribery and few cases of favoritism are brought to court. We thus
19Harvard professor Steven Kelman was the director of the Oﬃce of Federal Procuremnt Policy under
1993-1997.
20This would be most eﬃcient in a one-shot situation or when some ﬁrms are excluded from the cartel. At
least it would create new problems for a cartel.
20suggest that sophisticated economic expertise be given more power in cases where there is a
suspicion of favoritism. Indeed, while this is the rule in cases of standard collusion, economist
expertise appears to be seldom requested in cases involving corruption and favoritism.
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23AP r o o f o f L e m m a 1
For any announcement b α, the eﬃcient speciﬁcation for ﬁrm i is deﬁned: q∗
i =a r gm a xs(q, b α)−
ci (q,θi). We claim that in the equilibrium of the FSA both ﬁrms oﬀer the eﬃcient speciﬁ-
cation corresponding to their cost structure. Assume that this was not the case i.e., that, in
equilibrium, ﬁrm i oﬀers (b q,b p) with b q 6= q∗
i. We ﬁrst note that under asymmetric informa-
tion prob{win|((b q,b p))} > 0. To show this we order the ﬁrms’ type according to the number







is the highest cost type (recall the fully inef-
ﬁcient types have been deleted from the distribution). Let S∗ (θ)=m a x q s(q, b α)−ci (q,θ), in

















, it could not be an equilibrium oﬀer
since the score in decreasing in cost i.e., there would exist another oﬀer that would yield
higher expected proﬁt.
We now show that oﬀer (q∗
i,p0) with p0 = b p + s(q∗
i, b α) − s(b q, b α) dominates (b q,b p). Note
that S (q∗
i,p0)=S (b q,b p) so in particular prob{win|(b q,b p)} = prob{win|(q∗
i,p0)}. Now the


















=[ b p − ci (b q,θi)+s(q∗, b α) − ci (q∗
i,θi) − (s(b q, b α) − ci (b q,θi))]prob{win|(b q,b p)}
> [b p − ci (b q,θi)]prob{win|(b q,b p)} = πi (b q,b p;θi)}.
The last inequality holds because s(q∗, b α) − ci (q∗
i,θi) >s(b q, b α) − ci (b q,θi).
The argument applying to the symmetric information case which we also use below (in
Proposition 1, 2 and 4) is even simpler. Consider the case when ﬁr m1h a sac o s ts t r u c t u r et h a t
is more congruent with the announced scoring rule than ﬁrm 2. Firm 1 is sure to win when
submitting the second highest score (corresponding to ﬁrm 2’s eﬃcient speciﬁcation associated
with a price bid equal to its cost) because the tie breaking rule favors quality. Suppose ﬁrm
2 submits an oﬀer that does not include the eﬃcient speciﬁcation and ﬁrm 1 matches that
score. Then ﬁrm 2 could switch to an oﬀer that includes the eﬃcient speciﬁcation to achieve a
higher score and win. Suppose now that ﬁrm 1 matches ﬁrm 2’s score with an oﬀer that does
not include the eﬃcient speciﬁcation. Appealing to the argument above (setting the winning
probability equal to 1), we see that it cannot be optimal. Firm 1 could earn a higher proﬁt
24with an oﬀer that scores the same but includes the eﬃcient speciﬁcation. Similar reasoning
applies when ﬁrms are identically eﬃcient. Hence, in equilibrium ﬁrms submit oﬀers that




B Proof of proposition 1
We consider the following strategies for the players:
Firms:
At step 1 make a menu of deal oﬀer
©¡
αj,b ∗¢ª
with a deal for each component j; θji =
θ with αj =( 0 ,...,1j,...,0). The same bribe is oﬀered in each one of the deals belonging to
the oﬀered menu. Both ﬁrms oﬀer b∗ = (θ−θ)
2θθ .
A step 3 When the announced scoring rule is single-peaked, ﬁrms submit the competitive
equilibrium oﬀers while assuming that they are anti-symmetric in cost. When the scoring
rule is not single-peaked, they submit the competitive oﬀers under the assumption that their
cost structures are identical.
The auctioneer:
At step 2
The auctioneer selects from among the submitted corrupt deals that include scoring rules
only demanded by one ﬁrm, a deal associated with the highest bribe provided the bribe covers
the cost m. He announces the associated scoring rule.
We below show that the strategies described above form a Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the
game. For that purpose we ﬁrst derive the competitive oﬀers that form the symmetric infor-
mation Nash equilibrium of the First Score Auction described by step 3 and 4 with no bribes.
Consider the cost structures θ1 and θ2. Deﬁne the eﬃcient ﬁrm: i∗ =a r g m a xs(q∗
i, b α) −
c (q∗
i,θi) where q∗





,i=1 ,2,j=1 ,...k. We
refer to i∗ as ﬁrm 1 and appealing to Lemma 1, we focus on the price bids. By a standard





















1 = θ) and β0 =
P
α2







2θ where we do not specify
25the cost parameter for the cases when ﬁrms have identical cost. Firm 2’s score can be
computed s(q∗







2θ. Firm 1’s best response is to bid the lowest











(β11 − β21). (6)






(β11 − β21). (7)




2) deﬁned in Lemma 1 and (5) and (6) the equilibrium
competitive bids.
We now proceed to investigate the complete game by backward induction. Step 4 is
neglected throughout the appendix since players’ move are fully determined by the rules of
the game. At Step 3 ﬁrms make their oﬀers. Consider ﬁrst the subgames when b α = αj
for some j =1 ,...,k and say it favors ﬁrm 1. Because the auctioneer’s strategy calls for
never announcing a scoring rule demanded by both, ﬁrms infer from b α = αj that they
are anti-symmetric in cost with respect to θj so in particular when a ﬁrm is not favored




1 is deﬁned in (6). We claim that ﬁrm 2 bids p∗
2 deﬁn e di n( 5 ) .A s s u m e
by contradiction that in equilibrium p2 = c(q∗
2,θ2)+x>p ∗
2. Firm 1’s best response is
p1 = p2 + (θ−θ)
θθ (β11 − β21) >p ∗
1.B u tﬁrm 2 could lower its price and win a positive payoﬀ -




1,θ1)+b1, ﬁrm 1 cannot
w i nw i t hp o s i t i v ep r o ﬁt. We below show that this cannot happen in equilibrium. Note that
in a subgame where b α = αj but θ1j = θ2j then either both ﬁrms are favored or both are non-
favored. Since ﬁrms make their oﬀer under the assumption that costs are asymmetric, they
submit identical oﬀers. In a subgame where ˆ α 6= αj, ﬁrms infer that (q∗
1,p ∗
1, ˆ α)=( q∗
2,p ∗
2, ˆ α)
so proﬁt-if-win is zero and no bribe will be paid. By deﬁnition the proposed oﬀers are
best response to each other. Hence, the Nash equilibrium oﬀers of FSA without corruption
described in Lemma 1 and (5) and (6) are part of an equilibrium.




mi=1 . The auctioneer expects ﬁrms to ask for scoring rules that emphasize
c o m p o n e n t si nw h i c ht h e yh a v el o wc o s t . I fb o t ha s kf o rt h es a m es c o r i n gr u l e ,w h i c hc a n
happen since they don’t know each other’s cost, the auctioneer knows ﬁrms will be submitting
26identical contract oﬀers if that scoring rule is announced. But then he receives no bribe.
So he never selects a scoring rule demanded by both. Since U = b − m, he selects ˆ αk ∈




mi=1 and bk ≥ m.I f n o
such deal has been submitted the auctioneer announces the true α.21
At step 1 We know from step 2 that the auctioneer selects a deal associated with the high-
est bribe among those with scoring rules demanded by one ﬁrm only. Firms simply demand
scoring rules that maximizes the proﬁt-if-win π1 = (θ−θ)
2θθ (β11 − β21) which is decreasing in
β21 so ﬁrm 1 sets β21 =0i.e., all the weight is be put on components θr
1j = θ. Next, the




1 = θ) must be such that
P
αj (θr
1 = θ)=1,i m p l y i n g
∂β11
∂αj > 0 so
π1 is maximized with any α
j
1 =( 0 ,...,1j,...,0); θr
1j = θ.T h eﬁrms don’t know each other’s
cost, so for any give M2(1) the probability that the auctioneer ﬁnds a deal with a scoring rule
demanded by only one ﬁrm increases with the number of submitted deals by ﬁrm 1(2). So
it is optimal to submit a deal on each low cost component. A ﬁrm’s proﬁt-if-win with any
of the αj it demands is equal to (θ−θ)
2θθ . The corruption game boils down into a symmetric








C Proof of proposition 2
We ﬁrst introduce a function G(α,θi) representing the social gain corresponding to the
eﬃcient speciﬁcation. By Lemma 1, ﬁrms choose the social eﬃcient speciﬁcation proﬁle












The object of proposition 2 is a repeated FSA game of complete information, we propose
a simple Grim Trigger (GT) strategy for sustaining collusion. As usual it is composed of
a punishment phase and a cooperative phase. In the punishment phase each ﬁrm gets the
payoﬀ of the stage game Nash equilibrium (deﬁned in the proof of proposition 1). These non-
cooperative payoﬀs can be expressed as the diﬀerence between the values of the G function
21We do not analyze the case of coincidence of true α with the one in some corrupt deal. Because it has a
zero probability and hence it has no eﬀect on a choice of corrupt deals by ﬁrms at Step 1.












where the notation Eα,θ1,θ2 {.|.} stands to taking the conditional expectation over random
variables α, θ1 and θ2. Notice that due to symmetry, ﬁrm 2 gets the same payoﬀ Eπne.
In the cooperative phase, ﬁrms collude to collect the highest feasible expected proﬁt. This
proﬁti sa c h i e v e dw h e nt h eﬁrm, say ﬁrm i, with the highest value of G g i v e nb y( 8 )( t h eﬁrm
w i t ht h ec o s ts t r u c t u r eθ the most congruent to α) wins the auction and retain the entire
social gains from the contract i.e., it earns G(α,θi). The expected per period payoﬀ of ﬁrm






















We now describe a GT strategy. The game starts in the cooperative phase. In the
cooperative phase in each period t the ﬁr mw i t ht h eh i g h e s tv a l u eo fG(αt,θt) is designated
as the current winner. The winner makes an oﬀer that scores zero while the loser makes an
oﬀer that scores negative. In case of tie in G(αt,θt
i), they toss a coin, so with probability
.5 each ﬁrm is designated as the in-turn winner. If the actual winner is diﬀerent from the
designated winner in some period t, from the next period on the ﬁrms revert to the play of
the Nash equilibrium of the stage game (punishment phase).
We now deﬁne the range of the discount factor δ f o rw h i c ht h eG Ts t r a t e g yi sa ne q u i -
librium strategy. According to the one-stage-deviation principle we check for the highest
gain from deviation within a period. This gain is maximal in a period when the designated
loser has the highest value of G. This, for example, takes place when at some time period
α has only one nonzero component with weight equal to 1, and for instance all components
of θ1 and θ2 are equal to θ.H e r e G(α,θ1)=G(α,θ2)=1 /(2θ), and say the tie breaking
rule ruled against ﬁrm 2. Firm 2 can then achieve a one period proﬁtc l o s et o1/(2θ) by
slightly overbidding ﬁrm 1’s equilibrium oﬀer. However from the next period on the play











28so the GT strategy form an equilibrium with collusion of the repeated FSA for δ ≥ δ0 where
δ0 is given by
δ0 =
1/(2θ) − Eπc
1/(2θ) − Eπc + Eπne < 1.
QED
D Proof of Proposition 3
We show that the collusive equilibrium of proposition 3 can be supported by a Trigger strategy
with a punishment phase corresponding to the play of the equilibrium of proposition 1. The
cooperative phase is characterized by the following:
Firms’ strategy
At step 1 the in-turn-ﬁrm submits a menu Min =
©¡
b∗,αj¢ª
with θin,j = θ,b ∗ = m.T h e
out-of-turn ﬁrm submits Mout =
©¡
0,αj¢ª
for some θout,j,b ∗ =0 .
At step 3 For any b α
tthe in-turn ﬁrm submits an oﬀer that scores zero. The out-of-turn
ﬁrm bids to score strictly less than zero.
The auctioneer’s strategy
At step 2
The auctioneer selects from among the submitted corrupt deals a one associated with the
highest bribe. If that bribe covers the costs, he announces the associated scoring rule.
Let Ht−1 = H∗ denote a public history of the game when it is in a cooperative phase i.e.,
in all t0 =1 ,...,t−1 the outcome is characterized by the ﬁrm wining in alternation i.e., every
second period.
The trigger strategy entails that in any subgame following Ht−1 6= H∗, the ﬁrms move to
(stay in) the punishment phase. Since it is a Nash equilibrium, conforming is by construction
a best response for all players.
We now consider a subgame following Ht−1 = H∗ to show that cooperating according to
the strategies deﬁned above is optimal. We proceed by backward induction.
At step 3 whatever b α
t, the in-turn ﬁrm expects the out-of-turn ﬁrm to bid less that zero.
The maximal payoﬀ πc = 1
2θ yields when the in-turn ﬁrm oﬀers the eﬃcient speciﬁcation and
ap r i c es oi t so ﬀer scores just zero. So the proposed strategy is optimal. The out-of-turn
ﬁrm may deviate. The most proﬁtable deviation occurs when the announced scoring rule is
29single-peaked and the out-of-turn ﬁrm also has low cost on the emphasized component and
submits p = 1
θ − ε. Its gain is πd = 1
2θ − ε. However the in-turn rule is violated and from the
next period on the ﬁrms revert to the zero payoﬀ competitive equilibrium of proposition 1.















which is satisﬁed for δ ≥ δ1 ≤ 1 with
∂δ1
∂m > 0.
At step 2 Since the auctioneer is a short-run player, the argument developed in the proof of
proposition 1 carries over. A distinction is that the auctioneer needs not care about avoiding
scoring rules submitted by both because ﬁrms never submit identical oﬀers in response to
single peaked scoring rules..
At step 1 the ﬁrms submit their menu of deals. Since the auctioneer only cares about
the bribe the argument of proposition 1 carry over and ﬁr m sa l w a y sp r o p o s ed e a l sw i t h
single-peaked scoring rules. The in-turn ﬁrm expects the out-of-turn ﬁrm to oﬀer b =0 . It
is suﬃcient to oﬀer b = m to cover the auctioneer’s cost so he announces one of the in-turn
ﬁrm’s preferred scoring rule. The out-of-turn ﬁrm can defect and oﬀer b = m + ε associated
with a menu including a most preferred scoring rule αout. It knows that the auctioneer would
respond by announcing that b α= αout. But such a deviation only brings proﬁt if the out-of-
turn wins the oﬃcial auction. Since we know that such a win triggers a punishment phase,
under (11) defection is not proﬁtable. Hence for δ satisfying 11 the proposed strategies do
form a Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the repeated game. The cartel’s gain is maximized. In
each period, the scoring rule is the most favorable to the winner, the price is given by the
reserve score and the bribe is the lowest possible.QED
E Proof of Proposition 4
Firms’ strategy:
At step 1 The ﬁrms oﬀer a deal for its low cost component with a single-peaked scoring
rule emphasizing that component and the bribe b∗ (m) deﬁned below.
A step 3,t h eﬁrms submit the competitive oﬀers relative to the announced scoring rule.
The auctioneer’s strategy
At step 2
30The auctioneer selects from among the submitted deals, the one that maximizes his payoﬀ.
He announces the associated scoring rule provided the bribe covers the cost.
We below show that the strategies described above form a symmetric Bayes-Nash equi-
librium with favoritism. We develop the proof in terms of ﬁrm 1 which has its advantage in
the production of q1. Firm 2 is symmetric with advantage in component 2. We proceed by
backward induction.
At Step 3, In the present context ﬁrms know each other costs yet we can apply the same









.I nP r o p o s i t i o n1ﬁrms correctly believe they are asymmetric in cost. here they
simply know that.
As t e p2the auctioneer’s utility function is bi − m(αi − α)
2 . So it is optimal to choose
a deal among the submitted ones as follows b i =a r g m a x {(b1,α1)(b2,α2)} bi − m(αi − α)
2 s.t.
bi ≥ m(αi − α)
2 . In case of ties, he selects each ﬁrm with equal probability.The auctioneer
announces αe i if i∗ ¡
αe i
¢
= b i. If no bribe deal can secure win in the oﬃcial auction or if
be i <m
¡
αe i − α
¢2, the auctioneer announces the true alpha.
As t e p1We start with a Lemma
Lemma 2 In a symmetric equilibrium ﬁrms always demand the ”cartel eﬃcient” scoring
rule contingent on their cost structure i.e., α∗
1 =1and correspondingly α∗
2 =0 .
For ﬁrm 1, the "cartel eﬃcient" scoring rule is deﬁned α∗
1 =a r gm a x e α1
½
(θ−θ)




It is the scoring rule that maximizes the cartel’s payoﬀ given that there is a cost asso-
ciated with deviations from the true scoring rule. We know that the auctioneer selects
the ﬁrm whose deal maximizes U(bi,α i)=bi − m(αi − α)
2 . Suppose by contradiction
that an equilibrium oﬀer is (b1,α 1) with α1 6= α∗














































































(2α1 − 1) − b1
#
prob(U (b1,α 1) >U(b2,α 2))
where the inequality holds because m<(θ−θ)
2θθ .
Hence α∗
1 =1and similarly for ﬁrm 2: α∗
2 =0 .


















b1 − m(1 − α)























































In a symmetric equilibrium the auctioneer never distorts more than .5 so the highest cost
for distortion is 1





2θθ , the investigated strategies
described above including the deal oﬀers (b∗,1) and (b∗,0) form a Bayes-Nash equilibrium of
the FSA with favoritism.Q E D .
F Proof of proposition 5
In this proof we consider two types of collusion, characterize the condition for their sustain-
ability and compare them in terms of cartel eﬃciency.
32“ I nt u r nr u l e ”c o l l u s i o n :
This type of collusion is similar to the one constructed in Proposition 3. The strategies
are the same as the ones described in the proof of proposition 3 when putting k =2 . Any
deviation from those strategies triggers the play of the Nash equilibrium of proposition 4 from
the next period on.
As usual we investigate the game by backward induction and focus on incentives to comply
in a period following a history of compliance play.
At Step 3 the designated winner, say ﬁrm 1, has no incentive to deviate while the other
ﬁrm might undercut the oﬀer of ﬁrm 1 and get at most 1
2θ in the current period and a




2θθ − b∗ (m)
¾
afterwards. Given that b∗ (m)=(θ−θ)
2θθ −















where the rhs is the compliance payoﬀ and the lhs is the deviation payoﬀ.W es h o w b e l o w
that deterring deviation at step 1 is more constraining so we postpone the derivation of the
limit on the discount factor.
At step 2 there is no incentive to deviate for the agent for reason similar to those in propo-
sition 4. At step 1 ﬁrm 2 might make a secret bribe bid of b ∈ (0,2m] and demand ˆ α =0 .T h e
agent will grant ﬁrm 2 the favor of choosing its demanded scoring rule when α ∈ [0,b/(2m)].
Firm 2 then gets a payoﬀ of 1




2θθ − b∗ (m)
¾
.T h e




























In order for b =0to be an equilibrium strategy, the above expression needs to be maxi-
mized at b =0 . Since the expression is strictly concave in b we get the following restriction
for the discount factor
∂E
∂b
















2θθ but to simplify the calculation, we check for m = (θ−θ)
2θθ the constraint is most
restrictive then. Thus a conservative formulation of the constraint on the discount factor







We use the notation: w1(2) (1) and w1(2) (0) to denote ﬁrm 1(2) continuation after a
period when the announcement is b α =1and b α =0respectively. We focus on a smaller set of





so in particular we only consider a defection that secures
win. To outcompete ﬁrm 1 when the true scoring rule is most favorable to it e.g. α =1 , ﬁrm
2m u s to ﬀer 5
4m. This is not crucial to the result but it simpliﬁes the presentation.
Let Ht−1 = H∗ denote a history of the game where in all periods t0,t 0 =0 ,..t− 1,we
have b α
t0




=0for t0 such that i∗t0






We propose the following strategies for the players:
i. If Ht−1 6= H∗, the ﬁrms and the auctioneer play the equilibrium strategies depicted in
proposition 4.
ii. If Ht−1 = H∗,
The ﬁrms’ strategy
At step 1 Firm 1(2) submits a deal (α1,b 1)( ( α2,b 2)) with α1 =1 ,α 2 =0and b1 = b2 =
1
4m.
At step 3 If b α
t =1and αt−1 =0ﬁrm 1submits an oﬀer including the corresponding
eﬃcient speciﬁcation such that the oﬀer scores zero. Firm 2 submits an oﬀer that scores at
most zero. If b α
t = αt−1 =1 , ﬁrm 2 submits an oﬀer that scores more than zero such that it
yields a payoﬀ (1 − δ)w1 (1) to ﬁrm 1 (the average of continuation payoﬀ when ﬁrm 1 wins
for the second time in a row) when ﬁrm 1 exactly matches ﬁrm 2’s score. Firm 1 strategy is
to submit an oﬀer that score at most ﬁrm 2’s score. When b α
t =0the strategies are similarly
deﬁned with b α
t =0 ,α t−1 =1leading to zero score bids, and b α
t = αt−1 =0leading to bids
that yield (1 − δ)w2 (0).
The auctioneer’s strategy
At step 2, the auctioneer selects the corruption deal that maximizes his utility provided
the bribe covers expected costs and he announces the corresponding scoring rule. In case of
ties he randomizes.
We below show that these strategies form a Perfect Public Equilibrium of the repeated
game with the stage game as described in section 5. Collusive bidding at step 3 is sustainable
r e l y i n go na na r g u m e n ts i m i l a rt ot h eo n ed e v e l o p e di nP r o p o s i t i o n3w h e ns e t t i n gk =2
34and ﬁrms are anti-symmetric in costs. The non-favored (say 2) ﬁrm’s incentives to comply




2w2 (0) = 1
2θ − ε + δ
(1−δ)
1
2πne t h el o w e s tc o m p l i a n c ep a y o ﬀ is set equal to the defection
payoﬀ.
At step 2 the proposed strategy is optimal for the auctioneer appealing to the same
argument as in proposition 4. At step 1 the ﬁrms may consider defection and oﬀer a deal
with a bribe equal to 5
4m. The defection payoﬀ is at most πd = πc − 5
4m while the expected






. We ﬁr s tn o t et h a tf o rm ≥ 4
9πc there is no incentive to
defect. But for m<4






























































the continuation payoﬀ following an announce-
ment of b α =1must be lower that the one following b α =0 . This payoﬀ is achieved by
letting ﬁrm 2 submit an oﬀer in the oﬃcial auction that induces a lower proﬁtt oﬁrm 1. For
m = 4
9πc (the highest m for which there is an incentive to deviate), the rhs is equal to 0.
Consider the following strategy that satisﬁes the constraint. The full punishment is taken in
the next-following period and "the clock is reset" i.e., the next following payoﬀsi nt +2are
determined as if b αt =0 . Note that when (14) holds incentives to comply in a period following
an announcement of α =1also are satisﬁed. This is because the gain from defection are
lower then. Hence, for δ ≥δ2 and w1 (1) = w2 (0) satisfying (14) the proposed strategies form
a Perfect Public Equilibrium of the repeated game.
As m → 4
9πc the equilibrium average expected payoﬀ of the contingent scheme tends
toward 1
2 (πc − m/4) = 4





4 − 1, the contingent scheme yields a higher expected payoﬀ. W en o t et h a t
the condition m ≥ 4








2θθ which requires θ ≤ 4
9θ.
On the other side when m → 0 the rhs of (14) tends to πc implying πt+1
1 (1) → 0
corresponding to an average equilibrium expected payoﬀ in the contingent scheme of 1
4πc
35which is strictly smaller than the average payoﬀ in the in-turn scheme πc
(1+δ). QED
36